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Published: Jul 18, 2010 by Editor
Filed under:
News
KABUL, Afghanistan — Western leaders are banking on a national peace
council set to begin here on Wednesday to start a new chapter in Afghanistan’s
political life, bringing the country together and strengthening
President Hamid Karzai, even as
security deteriorated on Sunday in several areas of the country.
In a joint news conference, the NATO
commander, Gen. Stanley A.
McChrystal, and the senior civilian representative, Mark Sedwill, emphasized that the West supported
the peace council, called a jirga, even as many Afghans questioned
whether those attending would truly represent the many factions in the
country.
“This is a big week for Afghanistan,” said Mr. Sedwill, who described
the conference as “the first of a series of major political events that
are going to set the agenda of 2010.”
The jirga will be followed by the Kabul Conference on economic
development in July and parliamentary elections in September.
“This is a critical moment for this country to bring together all of
the people of Afghanistan, their representatives, in an opportunity to
set the direction forward and create a national consensus behind the
overall approach to security, to development, to reconciliation,” Mr.
Sedwill said.
The Electoral Complaints Commission announced Sunday that 85
candidates had been preliminarily barred from participating in the
parliamentary elections because they are members of illegal armed
groups. They will have the right to appeal. Still, the number is far
more than that in the first round of parliamentary elections in 2005,
when just 17 people were disqualified for the same reason, according to a
former E.C.C. commissioner, Fahim Hakim.
The increase suggests that a more rigorous review system is now in
place, analysts say.
Even as the peace efforts proceed in the capital, Kabul, security
appeared to be deteriorating in districts in the east and south of the
country and on the western border, where Afghan insurgents trained in
Iran are returning to fight and smuggling in weapons, General McChrystal
said.
“There is clear evidence of Iranian activities, in some cases
supplying weaponry and training to the Taliban that is
inappropriate,” he said.
In Nuristan Province, on the country’s eastern border, hundreds of
local and Pakistani Taliban have taken control of a remote
district near the Pakistan border, Barg-e-Matal. The number of fighters
who have crossed the border from Pakistan swelled through the week and
now has reached 1,000 to 1,500, said Gen. Zaman Mamozai, the commander
of the Afghan Border Police for the eastern region of Afghanistan.
They are “mostly from Pakistan and are conducting collective
attacks,” he said.
It appears that many of the Taliban from Pakistan had come to
Nuristan in search of a new haven after having come under attack from the Pakistani
Army in Pakistan. There are few Afghan security troops in Nuristan’s
rugged mountains and only a small number of American troops in the
province.
NATO leaders say that they cannot control the entire country with the
number of troops they have and had to rely on Afghan forces in remote
areas. But because not enough Afghans have been trained, NATO officials
say they may have to live with some insurgent havens.
“As we execute our strategy and our capacity to secure areas, we must
prioritize the order in which we do those, and how we deploy our forces
and our assets,” General McChrystal said when asked whether
Barg-e-Matal was being allowed to become a sanctuary.
“The Taliban can still muster strength in places and there are a lot
of unknowns there,” added a senior NATO officer, speaking about Nuristan
on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on
the record on the matter.
“If there are Taliban there, so what?” he said, adding that the
district was far from any population center. He acknowledged that the
situation would become more complicated if the Taliban filter out of
remote mountain redoubts and into populated areas.
There was violence as well in the southeastern province of Khost,
where a barely completed high school, built with international aid, was
blown up late Saturday night by men using rocket-propelled grenades and
bombs.
The school, which cost $220,000 to build, would have provided
classrooms for 1,300 students, said Musa Majrooh, the spokesman for the
Khost Education
Department. A Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, denied that the
Taliban were involved in the blast.
Also in Khost, a suicide car bomber detonated his vehicle at the
entrance to the police battalion that patrols suburban areas. Nine
police officers were wounded, two of them seriously.
In Nangahar Province, in the east, which until recently was
relatively calm, two bombings killed five members of the Afghan security
forces, and in Badakhshan Province in the far northeast, six
counternarcotics officers were killed when their patrol vehicle was
blown up by a homemade bomb.
They were on a mission to eradicate poppy, and the province’s
governor, Baz Mohammed, accused narcotics traffickers and the Taliban of
setting the bomb.
Sharifullah Sahak and Waheed Abdul Wafa contributed reporting from
Kabul, and an Afghan employee of The New York Times from Khost.
The reality is that with a bigger
American occupation, with escalating military expenditures, the
Resistance is growing, surrounding the major cities, targeting meetings
in the center of Kabul and rocketing the biggest US military bases
around the country. It is clear that the US has lost the war politically
and is in the process of losing it militarily.
Introduction:
Despite almost a decade of warfare, including an invasion and
occupation, the US military and its allies and client state armed forces
are losing the war in Afghanistan. Outside of the central districts of a
few cities and the military fortresses, the Afghan national resistance
forces, in all of their complex local, regional and national alliances,
are in control, of territory, people and administration.
The
prolonged unending war has become a major drain on the morale of the US
armed forces and undermined civilian support in the US, limiting the
capacity of the White House to launch new imperial wars. The annual
multi-billion dollar military expenditures, are exacerbating the
out-of-control budget deficit and forcing harsh unpopular cuts on social
programs, at all levels of government. There is no end in sight, as the
Obama regime keeps increasing the number of troops by the tens of
thousands and military expenditures by the dozens of billions but the
resistance advances, both military and politically.
Faced with
rising popular discontent and demands for fiscal restraint by a wide
spectrum of banking and citizen groups, Obama and the general command
have sought "partial exit" via the recruitment and training of a large
scale long term Afghan mercenary army and police force under the
direction of US and NATO officers.
The US Strategy: The Making of an Afghan Neocolony
Between 2001-2010 the US military expenditures total $428 billion
dollars; the colonial occupation has led to over 7,228 dead and wounded
as of June 1, 2010. As the US military situation deteriorates, the
White House escalates the number of troops resulting in a greater number
of killed and wounded. During the past 18 months of the Obama regime
more soldiers were killed or wounded than in the previous eight years.
The White House and Pentagon strategy is premised on massive flows
of money, arms and an increase in the number of surrogates, mainly
subsidized warlords and puppet western educated ex-pats. The White House
"development aid" involves, literally, purchasing the transient
loyalties of clan leaders. The White House attempts to give a veneer of
legitimacy by running elections, which enhance the corrupt image of the
incumbent puppet regime in Kabul and its regional associates.
On
the military front, the Pentagon launches one "offensive" after
another, announcing one success after another, followed by a retreat and
return of the Resistance fighters. The US campaigns disrupt trade,
agricultural harvests and markets, while the air assaults targeting
"Taliban" and militants, more frequently than not end up killing more
civilians celebrating weddings, religious holidays and shoppers at
markets than combatants. The reason for the high percentage of civilian
killings is clear to everyone except the US Generals: there are no
distinctions between "militants" and millions of Afghan civilians since
the former are an integral part of their communities.
The key
and ultimately decisive problem facing the US occupation is that it is a
colonial enclave in the midst of a colonized people. The US, its local
puppets and its NATO allies are a foreign colonial army and its Afghan
military and police recruits are seen as mere instruments perpetuating
illegitimate rule. Every action, whether violent or benign, is perceived
and interpreted as transgressing the norms and historical legacies of a
proud and independent people. In everyday life, every move by the
occupation is disruptive; nothing moves except by command of the foreign
directed military and police. Under threat of force, people fake
co-operation and then provide assistance to their fathers, brothers and
sons in the Resistance. The recruits take the money and turn their arms
over to the Resistance. The paid village informants are double agents or
identified by their neighbors and targeted by insurgents.
The
Afghan collaborators, Washington's closest allies, are seen as corrupt
traitors; transient rulers who have their bags packed and US passports
in hand, ready to flee when the US is forced to exit. All the programs,
"reconstruction" funds, training missions and "civic programs" have
failed to win the allegiance of the Afghan people, now as in the past as
well as in the future, because they are seen as part of the US military
occupation ultimately based on violence.
Ten Reasons Why the Afghan Resistance Will Win:
1.) The Resistance has deep roots in the population – family
community, linguistic and cultural ties which the US does not possess
nor can "invent"; nor can these ties be bought, traded or replicated by
their Afghan 'collaborators' or imposed by propaganda.
2.) The
Resistance has fluid borders and broad international support especially
with Pakistan but also with other anti-imperialist, Islamic groups who
provide arms and volunteers and who engage in actively attacking the
logistical transport supply lines of US-NATO military in Pakistan. They
also pressure overseas US client regimes like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
Yemen and Somalia opening multiple fronts.
3.) Widespread
infiltration, voluntary, active and passive support of the Resistance
among the US recruited and trained Afghan military and police results in
crucial intelligence on troop movements. Desertions and absenteeism
undermines "military competence".
4.) The scope and breadth of
Resistance activity over extends the imperial armies at its current
strength and causes it to rely on unreliable Afghan security, who have
no stomach for killing their brethren, especially when directed against
communities with relatives or ethnic kin.
5.) Resistance allies
are more loyal, less corrupt and reliable because of deeply shared
beliefs. US allies are loyal only because of ephemeral monetary
gratification and the temporary presence of US military force.
6.)
The Resistance appeals to the people in the name of a return to law and
order in everyday life, which preceded the disruptive invasion. The US
promise of positive outcomes following a successful war, have no popular
resonance after a decade long destructive occupation.
7.) The
US has no belief system that can compete with the
religious-nationalist-traditionalist appeal of the Resistance to the
vast majority of village, small town and displaced rural population.
8.) The Resistance's support of Iraqi, Palestinian and other
anti-imperialist forces has a positive appeal among the Afghan people
who have seen the destructive results of US wars in Iraq and proxy wars
in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. The US backed Israeli assault of Lebanon
and the humanitarian ship destined for Palestine and the highly visible
presence of Zionist militants in the US government, repels the more
politically aware opinion leaders in Afghanistan.
9.) Afghans
have, by force of circumstances, longer staying power in resisting the
US military occupation, than the US people who have other, far more
pressing needs and the US military with growing commitments in the Gulf.
10.) The Afghan Resistance does not normally kill civilians in
combat missions since the US troops and NATO are clearly identified.
Whereas, the opposite is not true. The Afghans who are part of the
villages in occupied communities are subject to assassinations by
"Special Forces" and drone bombings. In these circumstances ordinary
people suffer the same military assaults as Resistance fighters.
A Failed Mission: The Incapacity to Build a Reliable,
Effective Afghan Mercenary Army
A US government audit published in late June of this year
demolished the Obama regime's claims that it is succeeding in building
an effective Afghan mercenary army and police capable of buttressing the
current client regime in Kabul. The Report, based on a detailed
analysis and field observations argues that the Obama Pentagon relies on
"standards [which are] woefully inadequate, inflating the abilities of
Afghan units that Mr. Obama called "core to our mission" (Financial
Times, June 7, 2010, p1). In other words, Obama continues to play the
con game, which he inaugurated during his electoral campaign with his
phony promises of 'change' and "ending the wars", and continued with his
bail out of Wall Street in the name of 'saving the economy'. He
followed up by escalating the war in Afghanistan by sending 30,000 more
troops and increasing military and police expenditures to $325.5
billion, approximately 132% higher than the last year of the Bush
Administration (Congressional Research Service, FY 2010 Supplemental for
Wars … June 2010).
The Obama regime's phony claims of progress
were based on self-serving bureaucratic and technical criteria, rather
than the actual fighting performance and behavior of the Afghan
mercenary army. The military command's reports and progress reports were
based on how many courses were taught, the length and breadth of
training and the amount and quality of arms and equipment supplied to
the Afghan troops. As the number of Afghan units passing the "training
missions" increased from zero to 22, between 2008 - 2009, the Pentagon
claimed extraordinary progress. To correct the errors, the Pentagon has
turned to "field assessments by commanders" – which is also failing,
since the officials have a vested interest in inflating the performance
of the Afghans mercenaries under their command in order to secure
promotions and merit badges. The Obama regime plans to increase the
Afghan military from 97,000 in November 2009 to 134,000 in October 2010,
to 171,000 in October 2011 a 75% increase in two years (Congressional
Research Service 2010, p 13). The same increase occurs with the police:
from 93,800 in November 2009 to 134,000 in October 2011 a 43% increase.
Obama's claim that the war is gradually being handed over to the US
"trained" Afghan army is fully belied by two other basic facts. The
White House has requested $1.9 billion – double the 2009 level under
Bush – for military construction of new bases and installations for a
"long term presence" (which the con-man Obama claims does not mean a
"permanent presence"). Secondly, using the familiar double-talk of the
Obama regime, Secretary of Defense Gates and Admiral Mullen, Chair of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff now argue that Obama's campaign promise of
beginning the retirement of troops in July 2010 really means "a day we
start transitioning … not a date we're leaving", which would be based on
"conditions on the ground … a several year process" (Gates Testimony
before Senate Armed Services Committee, December 2, 2009). In plain
English "transitioning" is not "leaving". It means staying, fighting and
occupying Afghanistan for decades. It means adding more troops,
building more bases. It means spending another $400 billion over the
next 5 years. And it means doubling the number of American soldiers
killed and wounded over the next 3 years, from over seven thousand to
fourteen thousand.
The criteria of 'success' in Afghanizing the
war is belied by the growing Americanizing of the bases, combat troops
and expenditures. The reason is that the Afghan army figures are as
phony as Obama's promises. The number of US personnel is growing because
the Afghan political puppets are so corrupt, ineffective and despised
by their people that Washington has to surround them with "monitors",
"advisers" and "operatives" who in turn are totally incapable of
relating to the needs and practices of the communities. Increased US
"aid" has led to greater corruption, more unfulfilled promises and
greater animosity from the would be popular recipients.
The
fundamental problem is that this is an American war and that is why
Afghan units suffer a 50% reduction of strength due to at a minimum, a
20% desertion rate, admitted by US military officials (Congressional
Research, op cit, p.14). In other words, the Afghan recruits, take the
money and their arms and return to their villages, neighborhoods,
families, and perhaps not a few, use their military training, joining
with the National Resistance. With such high levels of disaffection
among Afghan recruits and even officials it is not surprising that the
Resistance has such high quality intelligence on US troop movements.
Given the degree of disaffection it is not surprising that some of the
US intelligence collaborators are double agents or vulnerable to
exposure and execution. Faced with a billion dollar recruitment program
with high rates of desertion and the "turning of guns on their mentors,"
the White House, Pentagon and Congress refuse to recognize the reality
that the imperial occupations is the source of the resistance of almost
the whole people. Instead they call for more trainees, more funds for
"training programs", more "transparent" mercenary contractors.
The
reality is that with a bigger American occupation, with escalating
military expenditures, the Resistance is growing, surrounding the major
cities, targeting meetings in the center of Kabul and rocketing the
biggest US military bases around the country. It is clear that the US
has lost the war politically and is in the process of losing it
militarily.
Despite the most advanced military technology, the
drones, the Special Forces, the increase in the number of trainees,
advisers, NGOers and the building of more military bases, the Resistance
is winning. The White House by adding to the millions of displaced and
murdered and maimed Afghans is increasing the hostility of the vast
majority of the Afghans. Civilian killings are turning more and more of
their military recruits into deserters and "unreliable" soldiers. Some
of whom are 'turned' into committed combatants for the 'other side'. As
in Indo-China, Algeria and elsewhere, a popular, highly motivated
guerrilla resistance army, deeply embedded in the national-religious
culture of an oppressed population is proving more resistant, enduring
and victorious over an alien high tech imperial army. Obama's 'rule or
ruin' Afghan War, sooner rather than later, will ruin America and end
his shameful presidency.
www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19758
Published: Jul 18, 2010 by Editor
Filed under:
News
The US strategy in Afghanistan is in deep trouble. President Obama's
December announcement that US forces would begin to draw down from July
2011 is being widely read in South Asia as the beginning of the
endgame for the US and Nato in Afghanistan. Regional states are
beginning to jostle for influence. They will be left for the second
time in less than 25 years to deal with the consequences of a strategic
retreat by a major power from Afghanistan. The nature of America's
problems and Islamabad's support for the Afghan Taliban has moved
Pakistan into poll position to recover its "strategic depth" in
Afghanistan. If it does so, the Pakistan Army and ISI will undoubtedly
conclude that their support for Islamic extremism and terrorism has
been rewarded.
All four strands of the US-led transition strategy are going
badly. Efforts to create a powerful Afghan National Security Force to
provide security across the country are faltering; the
counterinsurgency or COIN strategy has backfired in Marjah and the
Kandahar operation has been delayed; the peace and reconciliation
process is failing because some of the main Afghan opposition parties
have declined to participate and Taliban representatives have insisted
they will not negotiate; and the efforts to legitimize the Karzai
government have been undermined by fraudulent elections and ongoing
allegations of corruption and incompetence. America's hand is being
weakened further by the civil-military tensions exposed in the "Rolling
Stone" article, which led to the sacking of General Stanley
McChrystal. The United States has seen nothing like it since the 1971
publication of "The Pentagon Papers" foreshadowed the ignominious
withdrawal from Vietnam.
The dilemma for the United States and
the rest of Nato is that with so much blood in the soil of Afghanistan
and so much money spent to resource the war, the Alliance needs a
success story to provide the political fig-leaf for disengagement and
persuade their respective publics that the price has been worth paying.
For the leaders of many Nato members, political futures are at stake.
Yet the scale of challenge in Afghanistan is so great, and the need to
find a resolution to the residual question of al-Qaida so pressing, that
neither the US nor Nato can achieve an exit strategy on their own
terms.
The most plausible success story, and one which would
allow forces to come home with political cover and the al-Qaida issue
addressed, is that the US and Nato have achieved a stable transition in
Afghanistan to an inclusive Afghan government, that the Taliban have
given up support for al-Qaida and come into the political process, and
that the US will retain a residual regional presence — as it has in
Iraq — to maintain downward pressure on al-Qaida in the theatre. The
United States has come to believe that the key to this entire narrative
is Pakistan.
Pakistan has resolutely supported the Afghan
Taliban since it was forced to flee Afghanistan in late 2001 and it is
from Pakistani sanctuaries and the main leadership shuras in Quetta,
Gerdi Jangal, Miram Shah, and Peshawar that the Afghan Taliban has
staged its comeback. Backed by the Pakistan Army/ISI the Afghan Taliban
is now once again in the ascendancy in Afghanistan and is thus key to
any US/Nato disengagement. This is why Pakistan's Generals Kayani and
Pasha have made a series of recent visits to Kabul in which they have
offered to broker deals with the various Afghan Taliban groups and the
Karzai regime; it is why Pakistan has now cleared the way for Mullah
Baradar to be extradited to Kabul to participate in the process, and it
is why secret meetings have been held with Sirajuddin Haqqani, and
others to seek to engineer an endgame. Pakistan has simultaneously been
pushing its erstwhile proxy Gulbuddin Hekmatyar into the process and
quietly boosting militant strength in the Afghan-Pakistan border region
by facilitating the movement of Punjabi Taliban into the theatre.
Pakistan is also circulating the idea that the Afghan Taliban will give
up al-Qaida to reach a deal, even though there are few reasons to
believe this is so and no means to enforce any such offer the Taliban
might make to ease the US/Nato withdrawal.
Pakistan's price for
being helpful to the US is acceptance of Pakistan's primacy in
Afghanistan and that it has a strong role in shaping US regional
engagement going forward. It is a measure of the desperation of the US
that they seem prepared to agree this deal, cede the lead to Pakistan,
and condemn the people of Afghanistan to Taliban rule or to civil war.
Simply
put, the United States seems ready to reward Pakistan's duplicitous
support for militant Islamic extremism with the huge geostrategic prize
of Afghanistan. The implications of this for India are grave indeed
and it is difficult to believe that a White House friendlier to Delhi
would ever have countenanced such a deal. India is emerging as a great
power and with great power come commensurate obligations. India must
take a stronger hand in Afghanistan and find a response which provides
the United States and Nato with another way forward, which offers the
people of Afghanistan an alternative to the Taliban or civil war, and
which denies Pakistan a strategic victory which will surely resonate
across the region for generations to come.
The writer is
founder-director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the
University of Bradford, UK
WASHINGTON — The United States has discovered nearly $1 trillion in
untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan,
far beyond any previously known reserves and enough to fundamentally
alter the Afghan economy and perhaps the Afghan war itself, according to
senior American government officials.
The previously unknown deposits — including huge veins of iron,
copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium — are so big
and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that
Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most
important mining centers in the world, the United States officials
believe.
An internal Pentagon memo, for example, states that Afghanistan could
become the “Saudi Arabia of lithium,” a key raw material in the
manufacture of batteries for laptops and BlackBerrys.
The vast scale of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth was discovered by a
small team of Pentagon officials and American geologists. The Afghan
government and President Hamid Karzai were
recently briefed, American officials said.
While it could take many years to develop a mining industry, the
potential is so great that officials and executives in the industry
believe it could attract heavy investment even before mines are
profitable, providing the possibility of jobs that could distract from
generations of war.
“There is stunning potential here,” Gen. David H. Petraeus,
commander of the United States Central Command, said in an interview on
Saturday. “There are a lot of ifs, of course, but I think potentially it
is hugely significant.”
The value of the newly discovered mineral deposits dwarfs the size of
Afghanistan’s existing war-bedraggled economy, which is based largely
on opium production and narcotics trafficking as well as aid from the
United States and other industrialized countries. Afghanistan’s gross
domestic product is only about $12 billion.
“This will become the backbone of the Afghan economy,” said Jalil
Jumriany, an adviser to the Afghan minister of mines.
American and Afghan officials agreed to discuss the mineral
discoveries at a difficult moment in the war in Afghanistan. The
American-led offensive in Marja in southern Afghanistan has achieved
only limited gains. Meanwhile, charges of corruption and favoritism
continue to plague the Karzai government, and Mr. Karzai seems
increasingly embittered toward the White House.
So the Obama administration is hungry for some positive news to come
out of Afghanistan. Yet the American officials also recognize that the
mineral discoveries will almost certainly have a double-edged impact.
Instead of bringing peace, the newfound mineral wealth could lead the
Taliban to battle even
more fiercely to regain control of the country.
The corruption that is already rampant in the Karzai government could
also be amplified by the new wealth, particularly if a handful of
well-connected oligarchs, some with personal ties to the president, gain
control of the resources. Just last year, Afghanistan’s minister of
mines was accused by American officials of accepting a $30 million bribe
to award China the rights to develop its copper mine. The minister has
since been replaced.
Endless fights could erupt between the central government in Kabul
and provincial and tribal leaders in mineral-rich districts. Afghanistan
has a national mining law, written with the help of advisers from the World Bank, but it has never
faced a serious challenge.
“No one has tested that law; no one knows how it will stand up in a
fight between the central government and the provinces,” observed Paul A. Brinkley, deputy
undersecretary of defense for business and leader of the Pentagon team
that discovered the deposits.
At the same time, American officials fear resource-hungry China will
try to dominate the development of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, which
could upset the United States, given its heavy investment in the region.
After winning the bid for its Aynak copper mine in Logar Province,
China clearly wants more, American officials said.
Another complication is that because Afghanistan has never had much
heavy industry before, it has little or no history of environmental
protection either. “The big question is, can this be developed in a
responsible way, in a way that is environmentally and socially
responsible?” Mr. Brinkley said. “No one knows how this will work.”
With virtually no mining industry or infrastructure in place today,
it will take decades for Afghanistan to exploit its mineral wealth
fully. “This is a country that has no mining culture,” said Jack Medlin,
a geologist in the United
States Geological Survey’s international affairs program. “They’ve
had some small artisanal mines, but now there could be some very, very
large mines that will require more than just a gold pan.”
The mineral deposits are scattered throughout the country, including
in the southern and eastern regions along the border with Pakistan that
have had some of the most intense combat in the American-led war against
the Taliban insurgency.
The Pentagon task force has already started trying to help the
Afghans set up a system to deal with mineral development. International
accounting firms that have expertise in mining contracts have been hired
to consult with the Afghan Ministry of Mines, and technical data is
being prepared to turn over to multinational mining companies and other
potential foreign investors. The Pentagon is helping Afghan officials
arrange to start seeking bids on mineral rights by next fall, officials
said.
“The Ministry of Mines is not ready to handle this,” Mr. Brinkley
said. “We are trying to help them get ready.”
Like much of the recent history of the country, the story of the
discovery of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth is one of missed opportunities
and the distractions of war.
In 2004, American geologists, sent to Afghanistan as part of a
broader reconstruction effort, stumbled across an intriguing series of
old charts and data at the library of the Afghan Geological Survey in
Kabul that hinted at major mineral deposits in the country. They soon
learned that the data had been collected by Soviet mining experts during
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, but cast aside when
the Soviets withdrew in 1989.
During the chaos of the 1990s, when Afghanistan was mired in civil
war and later ruled by the Taliban, a small group of Afghan geologists
protected the charts by taking them home, and returned them to the
Geological Survey’s library only after the American invasion and the
ouster of the Taliban in 2001.
“There were maps, but the development did not take place, because you
had 30 to 35 years of war,” said Ahmad Hujabre, an Afghan engineer who
worked for the Ministry of Mines in the 1970s.
Armed with the old Russian charts, the United States Geological
Survey began a series of aerial surveys of Afghanistan’s mineral
resources in 2006, using advanced gravity and magnetic measuring
equipment attached to an old Navy Orion P-3 aircraft that flew over
about 70 percent of the country.
The data from those flights was so promising that in 2007, the
geologists returned for an even more sophisticated study, using an old
British bomber equipped with instruments that offered a
three-dimensional profile of mineral deposits below the earth’s surface.
It was the most comprehensive geologic survey of Afghanistan ever
conducted.
The handful of American geologists who pored over the new data said
the results were astonishing.
But the results gathered dust for two more years, ignored by
officials in both the American and Afghan governments. In 2009, a
Pentagon task force that had created business development programs in
Iraq was transferred to Afghanistan, and came upon the geological data.
Until then, no one besides the geologists had bothered to look at the
information — and no one had sought to translate the technical data to
measure the potential economic value of the mineral deposits.
Soon, the Pentagon business development task force brought in teams
of American mining experts to validate the survey’s findings, and then
briefed Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and
Mr. Karzai.
So far, the biggest mineral deposits discovered are of iron and
copper, and the quantities are large enough to make Afghanistan a major
world producer of both, United States officials said. Other finds
include large deposits of niobium, a soft metal used in producing
superconducting steel, rare earth elements and large gold deposits in
Pashtun areas of southern Afghanistan.
Just this month, American geologists working with the Pentagon team
have been conducting ground surveys on dry salt lakes in western
Afghanistan where they believe there are large deposits of lithium.
Pentagon officials said that their initial analysis at one location in
Ghazni Province showed the potential for lithium deposits as large of
those of Bolivia, which now has the world’s largest known lithium
reserves.
For the geologists who are now scouring some of the most remote
stretches of Afghanistan to complete the technical studies necessary
before the international bidding process is begun, there is a growing
sense that they are in the midst of one of the great discoveries of
their careers.
“On the ground, it’s very, very, promising,” Mr. Medlin said.
“Actually, it’s pretty amazing.”
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